Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect anti-competitive mergers.
Working Paper No. 542
Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers
Working Paper
Referens
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof och Johan Stennek (2000). ”Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers”. IFN Working Paper nr 542. Stockholm: Institutet för Näringslivsforskning.
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof och Johan Stennek (2000). ”Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers”. IFN Working Paper nr 542. Stockholm: Institutet för Näringslivsforskning.
Författare
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Johan Stennek
