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RAND Journal of Economics

Fines, Leniency, and Rewards in Antitrust

Tidskriftsartikel
Referens
Bigoni, Maria, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloé Le Coq och Giancarlo Spagnolo (2012). ”Fines, Leniency, and Rewards in Antitrust”. RAND Journal of Economics 43(2), 368–390. doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x

Författare
Maria Bigoni, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloé Le Coq, Giancarlo Spagnolo

This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well-run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white-collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.