By perturbing symmetric coordination games à la Bryant [Bryant, J., 1983. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 525–528] we derive unique solutions, the noise-proof equilibria. Our results agree with the experimental findings in Van Huyck et al. [Van Huyck, J.B., R.C. Battalio and R.O. Beil, 1990. American Economic Review 80, 234–248] and have an interesting connection with the notion of potential. We also briefly discuss median games.
Economics Letters
Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games
Tidskriftsartikel
Referens
Carlsson, Hans och Mattias Ganslandt (1998). ”Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games”. Economics Letters 60(1), 23–34. doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00076-7
Carlsson, Hans och Mattias Ganslandt (1998). ”Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games”. Economics Letters 60(1), 23–34. doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00076-7
Författare
Hans Carlsson,
Mattias Ganslandt
