This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces which are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and we show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria, and hence a strategically stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
Econometrica
Evolutionary Selection in Normal–Form Games
Tidskriftsartikel
Referens
Ritzberger, Klaus och Jörgen W. Weibull (1995). ”Evolutionary Selection in Normal–Form Games”. Econometrica 63(6), 1371–1399. doi.org/10.2307/2171774
Ritzberger, Klaus och Jörgen W. Weibull (1995). ”Evolutionary Selection in Normal–Form Games”. Econometrica 63(6), 1371–1399. doi.org/10.2307/2171774
Författare
Klaus Ritzberger,
Jörgen W. Weibull