James M. Buchanan Jr.

by Niclas Berggren[6]

James M. Buchanan (1919–2013) was born in rural Tennessee under rather simple circumstances: "It was a very poor life," he says (Buchanan 2009, 91). Still, he ended up, in 1986, as a recipient of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. The Prize was awarded "for his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making."

Buchanan earned his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago in 1948 and was thereafter a professor at the University of Tennessee, Florida State University, the University of Virginia, UCLA, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and George Mason University. In spite of his academic accomplishments, Buchanan felt himself to be apart from an established elite—academic, intellectual or political—and he even regarded that elite with suspicion. The attitude can be connected to Buchanan's ideological convictions and how these changed over the course of his lifetime.

In brief, Buchanan was an ideological migrant: he started out having socialist proclivities but abandoned these in his late twenties in favor of a classical liberal outlook, an outlook he retained for the remainder of his life.

There must be an asymmetry in any ideological profile of Buchanan, since there is more documentation about his post-socialist views than about those of his early years. Even though we know little about them, it seems fair to say that the youthful convictions were less systematic in character and less developed analytically. Still, they were there, and, I believe, the underlying motivation for them remained in place also for the liberal Buchanan. That motivation can perhaps best be described as *a strong dislike of privilege*. Here is a passage about his experience in the navy:

> Anyway, during the first month, I experienced discrimination, and it just got me all upset. If there is one thing I can't stand—and that's central—it's when somebody is treated unfairly, whether it's somebody else or whether it's me. A disproportionate number of us were from the South and the West, as opposed to the upper East. I experienced overt discrimination for being a non-Easterner, a non-establishmentarian. In the whole group of 600 boys, there were only

6. Research Institute of Industrial Economics, 102 15 Stockholm, Sweden; University of Economics in Prague, 130 67 Prague 3, Czech Republic.

> about twenty who were graduates of Yale, Harvard, Princeton—all Ivy League. By the end of this first boot camp period, they had to select midshipman officers. Out of the 20 boys from the establishment universities, 12 or 13 were picked, against a background of a total of 600. It was overtly discriminatory towards those of us who were not members of the establishment. That made me into a flaming communist. I would have signed up immediately to the Communist Party had a recruiter come along. I had already had strong left-wing socialist leanings, but now it was stronger than ever. I think I felt this stronger than anybody else. Even today, there is a residue still there. I don't ever get rid of that. Anyway, no recruiter came along, and I didn't sign my name on any communist manifest. But I would have! (Buchanan 2009, 92-93)

The dislike of unfair treatment is perfectly clear from this text (cf. Buchanan 2007, 49-50); it also indicates how the sentiment channeled Buchanan's political tendencies in a more radical direction. Why was he initially a socialist?

> [Buchanan:] It was fundamentally due to a populist background. I grew up with all those pamphlets from the time in the 1890s when several American states went Populist—pamphlets about the Wall Street Barons and the [Robber] Barons and all this stuff. And of course, the Democrats ran the South at that time; it was a one-party system. Then I got interested in economics, and everybody in my peer group was a socialist. We didn't get the right picture about what was going on. Russia was an ideal for us all. I even started learning Russian.
>
> [interviewer:] Wow! But did you trust the government generally?
>
> [Buchanan:] At that time I still implicitly held to this image that somehow the state was benevolent. I didn't start raising those kinds of questions until much later. (Buchanan 2009, 93)

Buchanan was asked in an interview whether he, as a socialist youngster, thought government ought to have a big role in running things. He replied that his attitude had been:

> Not so much pro-government as it was anti big business, anti Wall Street, anti the tycoons, anti the Rockefellers, anti the rich. (quoted in Henderson 1999, 5)

This reinforces that his socialism was, indeed, of a more populist kind. But there is, to my knowledge, no more precise information about the young Buchanan's ideological orientation, such as what socialist policies he might have advocated.

After Buchanan's service in the navy, he began thinking about pursuing graduate studies and ended up in Chicago on the advice of a professor he met as an undergraduate. He did so without knowing much about the Department of Economics: "Had I known that it was a market-oriented department, I would probably have gone somewhere else" (Buchanan 2009, 97).

But Buchanan did go to the University of Chicago, where he met economists like Frank Knight, Jacob Viner, Theodore Schultz and, at the very end, Milton Friedman. Of these, Knight made the biggest impression on him (see Buchanan 2001a; 2001b). And an ideological change was about to take place:

> [Interviewer:] And that was the end of your socialist inclinations, I guess. They must have turned you around?
>
> [Buchanan:] And in a hurry. We were about 30 people in Knight's course in price theory. Fifteen switched over completely within six to eight weeks, and 15 stayed exactly the way they were. They were socialist to start with and they were socialist when they came out. There was no distinction in the grades, it was no question of who was intelligent and who wasn't, it was rather that, somehow or another, you were preconditioned. And for some reason, I was preconditioned to buy into the workings of the market—which was something I had not really understood at all until I took Knight's course. (Buchanan 2009, 97)

Buchanan says that after those first weeks in Knight's course, he "had been converted into a zealous advocate of the market order" (Buchanan 1999, 15; cf. Buchanan 2001c, 165-166).

Buchanan's ideological shift shows how a change in knowledge and understanding can bring about a change in political opinions. If we regard such opinions as a function of two separate factors, beliefs about the world and values, then ideological shifts can come about either if a person gains new knowledge or if the values change. In Buchanan's case, what I take to be the motivating value, fairness in a sense that is against privilege, remained in place, but at Chicago, he got new knowledge and a new understanding, which transformed him politically. As Buchanan (2001d, 5) described his pre-Chicago thinking: "I remained blissfully ignorant of the coordinating properties of a decentralized market process, an ignorance that made me vulnerable to quasi-Marxist arguments and explanations about economic history and economic reality." Clearly, the ideological change

occurred as a result of new knowledge and a new understanding of how a market order functions.

Now, we have established that Buchanan had early socialist, at times maybe even communist, convictions, but that he changed into a pro-market economist while pursuing his Ph.D. in Chicago. What, more exactly, did he turn into? The rubric he himself preferred was "classical liberal," not to be confused with "liberal" in the everyday American meaning of the term or even with "conservative" (Buchanan 2005a).[7] And Buchanan was perhaps not really a "libertarian" either—he did not embrace natural rights, or similar constructs, as the basis for his political reasoning, and he did not in any strict way advocate a minimal state (and much less anarchy, in spite of having an intuitive appreciation of it).[8]

In his scholarly work, Buchanan developed a contractarian constitutionalism (see Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Brennan and Buchanan 1985; Buchanan 1987) that, to a large extent, defined his liberalism. The contractarian approach assumes that people desire a political order in which collective decisions can be made, and it insists that legitimacy in establishing constitutions (the political institutions within which collective decision-making takes place) derives from unanimous consent, although that consent might be only symbolic. Here we see Buchanan's strong passion for respecting the individual and for treating everybody equally: no arrangement, collective or otherwise, shall be deemed legitimate unless all those who partake in it have agreed to it.

Note, however, that this criterion of unanimous agreement applies to the constitutional level. Buchanan writes:

> The central contribution of this book [*The Calculus of Consent*] was to identify a two-level structure of collective decision-making. We distinguished between "ordinary politics," consisting of decisions made in legislative assemblies, and "constitutional politics," consisting of decisions made about the rules for ordinary politics. …
>
> From the perspective of both justice and efficiency, majority rule may safely be allowed to operate in the realm of ordinary politics provided that there is generalised consensus on the constitution, or on the rules that define and limit what can be done through ordinary politics. It is in arriving at this constitutional framework where Wicksell's idea of requiring unanimity—or at least super majorities—may be practically incorporated. (Buchanan 2003, 14-15)

7. Given Buchanan's visceral dislike of privilege, he should especially not be regarded as a conservative. Notably, Buchanan adhered to the liberal idea of "natural equality," contrasting it with the idea of "natural hierarchy" typical of many strains of conservatism (Buchanan 2005a, 4-6).
8. Buchanan served as President of the Mont Pelerin Society from 1984 to 1986.

The interesting thing, from the point of view of Buchanan's liberalism, is that the constitutional political order established in this fashion is one of procedure rather than content. In the terminology of Viktor Vanberg (2011), Buchanan advances *constitutional liberalism*, which respects a freedom of individuals to choose the constitutional environment in which they wish to live, rather than *liberal constitutionalism*, which focuses on the need to provide institutional safeguards of individual liberty as private autonomy. It is what people agree to that is desirable, and there is no external criterion available that can be used to discriminate between various institutional settings. For example, if people agree to institute a political system with a qualified majority rule, then such a system may, in due time, introduce certain types of redistribution which would violate many liberals' values. That outcome is, then, legitimate to a contractarian, procedural liberal. Naturally, there are different preferences among citizens, and those that dislike the arrangement may argue in favor of policy or institutional change, and proposals to abandon redistribution may become more popular and meet the approval of a qualified majority. If so, *that* outcome is legitimate.

There is no guarantee, in other words, that the system of rules chosen behind a veil of uncertainty, at the stage of constitutional formation, will be *substantively* liberal, in the sense advanced by F. A. Hayek (1973), or that they will give rise to outcomes that are liberal in that sense.[9] It is clear that a concept of freedom, which is normatively basic in all types of liberalism (Gaus and Courtland 2011), plays a central role here: but it is freedom *in and through constitutional contract*. As Vanberg puts it: "[T]his ideal of individual liberty is about *individual sovereignty in defining the rules* under which a group of persons chooses to live, rules that among free and equal individuals can only be chosen by voluntary agreement" (Vanberg 2011, 9, emphasis in original).

The foregoing description of Buchanan's liberalism has concerned the grand principles and how to understand them. To make his liberalism more concrete, I mention four applications. First, Buchanan (1993) developed an argument for private property rights that does not take efficiency as the starting point. Rather, Buchanan located the main value of such rights in the ability of individuals to lead their lives as they please—including, if they are willing to forgo the gains from specialization, the ability to withdraw from the market nexus and the dependence

9. Buchanan (1972) criticizes John Rawls for identifying "the difference principle" as the outcome of decision-making in the original position. Instead, he argues that a contractarian should accept the open-ended character of the constitutional process, which is compatible with many different distributional principles. Nevertheless, Buchanan (1991) predicts that institutions protecting a distinct sphere of voluntary exchange, along the lines of Adam Smith's idea of natural liberty, would find support behind a veil of uncertainty, at least if problems with externalities are perceived small.

on others it entails. By such choice, individual autonomy is preserved, a value highly cherished by Buchanan (not only in constitutional choice and in market exchange).

Second, Buchanan and Roger Congleton (1998) argued for a constitutional generality principle to constrain ordinary political decision-making. Buchanan's animus against privilege underlies the argument: without this principle, which requires that all citizens are treated equally *qua* citizens in all political decisions, some will use the political process to obtain favors at the expense of others.

Third, Buchanan favored a high inheritance tax. As Geoffrey Brennan writes:

> [Buchanan] believed rather passionately in confiscatory estate and gift duties: He reckoned that inherited wealth (though not self-made or first-generation wealth) violates basic equality of opportunity, and his enmity towards dynasties was notable. (Brennan 2013)

Again, Buchanan's dislike of privilege comes through and strongly influences his positions. On one occasion, I personally heard Buchanan say that he thought people in general shared a dislike of inherited wealth and that a high inheritance tax was needed to retain widespread support for the market system. This position again underlines that he was no strict libertarian.

Lastly, Buchanan (2005b) dolefully outlined a new attitude, "parentalism," which is the popular demand for government interventionism, care, and protection. He took a strongly negative view of this demand, as well as the corresponding supply of policies that restrict individual freedom of choice. Here, Buchanan illustrates his strong respect for an order in which individuals are free to make their own life choices without the interference of others. He is, however, slightly pessimistic about the chances to stop further infringements: people are, he laments, "afraid to be free."

One can be a liberal in the classical sense of the term for many different reasons. Buchanan first became a socialist because he thought that his moral intuitions on issues of fairness were best served by the type of policies dictated by such an ideology. He then learned about markets and the way they work and realized that his intuitions were better served by a deep respect for each individual, as exemplified in the market by voluntary exchange and in politics by a constitutional order based on voluntary and unanimous agreement. The particular basis for his politics, a rejection of privilege and domination, led him to embrace his particular kind of liberalism.

References

Brennan, Geoffrey. 2013. James Buchanan: An Assessment. *Liberty Matters, Online Library of Liberty*, March. **Link**

Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. 1985. *The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, James M. 1972. Rawls on Justice as Fairness. *Public Choice* 13(1): 123-128.

Buchanan, James M. 1987. The Constitution of Economic Policy. *American Economic Review* 77(3): 243-250.

Buchanan, James M. 1991. The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberalism. In *The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press.

Buchanan, James M. 1993. *Property as a Guarantor of Liberty*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Buchanan, James M. 1999. Better Than Plowing. In *Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty* (*The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan*, vol. I), eds. Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert D. Tollison. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Buchanan, James M. 2001a. Frank H. Knight: 1885-1972. In *Ideas, Persons & Events* (*The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan*, vol. XIX), eds. Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert D. Tollison. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Buchanan, James M. 2001b. Knight, Frank H. In *Ideas, Persons & Events* (*The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan*, vol. XIX), eds. Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert D. Tollison. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Buchanan, James M. 2001c. Liberty, Market and State. In *Ideas, Persons & Events* (*The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan*, vol. XIX), eds. Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert D. Tollison. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Buchanan, James M. 2001d. Born-Again Economist. In *Ideas, Persons & Events* (*The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan*, vol. XIX), eds. Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert D. Tollison. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Buchanan, James M. 2003. Public Choice: Politics Without Romance. *Policy* 19(3): 13-18.

Buchanan, James M. 2005a. *Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Buchanan, James M. 2005b. Afraid to Be Free: Dependency as Desideratum. *Public Choice* 124(1-2): 19-31.

Buchanan, James M. 2007. *Economics from the Outside In*. College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press.

Buchanan, James M. 2009. Interview by Karen Ilse Horn. In *Roads to Wisdom: Conversations with Ten Nobel Laureates in Economics* by Horn, 85-109. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Buchanan, James M., and Roger D. Congleton. 1998. *Politics By Principle, Not Interest: Toward Nondiscriminatory Democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962. *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press.

Gaus, Gerald, and Shane D. Courtland. 2011. Liberalism. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2011 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University (Stanford, Calif.). **Link**

Hayek, F. A. 1973. *Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order*. London: Routledge.

Henderson, David R. 1999. How Three Economists Switched from Socialist to Pro-Free Market: An Exploration in Oral History. Presented at the Allied Social Sciences Association Annual Meeting (New York), January.

Vanberg, Viktor J. 2011. Liberal Constitutionalism, Constitutional Liberalism and Democracy. *Constitutional Political Economy* 22(1): 1-20.

Bertil Ohlin

by Niclas Berggren

Bertil Ohlin (1899–1979), professor of economics and Nobel laureate in 1977, developed a social consciousness early on, both because of his mother's involvement in assisting the poor and because of his going to school with less well-to-do children.

In the 1920s—also Ohlin's twenties—he argued that the best method for helping the less fortunate was to increase economic growth: only by creating and sustaining conditions for higher production levels could living standards rise over the long term. He does not seem to have been very influenced by some radical contacts made in his early years (such as the British Fabians), although such influences were to matter later. Thus, he initiated his academic career in ideological agreement, at least on most issues of economic policy, with the leading Swedish economists of the day, Gustav Cassell and Eli Hecksher, who were devoted classical liberals. Heckscher helped Ohlin secure his first professorship at the University of Copenhagen when Ohlin was only 25 years old. Heckscher was also instrumental in Ohlin's subsequent transfer, in 1929, to the Stockholm School of Economics (Heckscher's own institution), where Ohlin was to remain.

An important reason for the attractiveness of classical liberalism among Swedish economists in the middle and end of the 1920s was the fact that a most severe economic crisis was gradually overcome by means of market-oriented measures. Between 1923 and 1929 the Swedish economy developed very well: prices were stabilized, unemployment fell, and GDP growth turned positive again. This was pointed out by Ohlin in a speech to the Copenhagen Student Association on February 14, 1926, where he voiced skepticism about government intervention and regulation (Larsson 1998, 42). In an interview in the newspaper *Ekstrabladet* on December 27, 1926, Ohlin asserted that market adjustments were instrumental for reducing unemployment (ibid., 87). The task of government is primarily to facilitate

labor mobility and to ensure that social measures do not diminish the incentives of unemployed persons to look for work. A month later in the *Stockholms-Tidningen* newspaper, Ohlin wrote: "The great speed with which wages were adjusted in the new situation most importantly contributed to shortening the crisis" (ibid.). In a farewell speech to the Copenhagen Student Association, he thought it "nonsense" to view the unemployment problem as the most important social issue of the day: that problem would largely take care of itself through marked adjustments (ibid., 58).

The *Ekstrabladet* interview led to Ohlin being criticized in Sweden for exemplifying the dogmatic view of economists (ibid., 87). Moreover, the Danish daily *Social-Demokraten* and its writer Knud Korst criticized Ohlin on December 3, 1926 for being one-sided in his pro-market speeches. Among the things that Korst disliked were Ohlin's advocacy of liberalizing markets, his critique of the wage policies of the labor unions (which Ohlin saw as the cause of unemployment; instead, he wanted wage rates to be more flexible), and his view of wealth accumulation as conducive to capital investment (ibid., 54).

But during Ohlin's stay in Copenhagen, which lasted from 1925 to 1929, he began his ideological reorientation which connected his early social involvement to his observations on problems in the worldwide economic system. Fellow economist Lauritz Birck exercised considerable influence in this regard. Ohlin recalled:

> I learned a lot from Birck. … His disclosure of the shortcomings of the economic system and the great risks to many people of an uneven distribution of power made things clear to me which I had hitherto not paid much attention to. … As I pointed out earlier, I had already, during my days in Lund, become interested in Rigano's proposal for high inheritance taxes. Now I drew the conclusion that an increase in income taxes through steeper progression was also well motivated. (Ohlin 1972, 122-123)

Another figure having influence on Ohlin was Danish politician Peter Munch, whose "social radicalism" entailed higher taxation, redistribution, a social-reform plan to reduce differences in living standards, as well as nationalized unemployment and accident insurance.

But the single most important source for Ohlin's change in ideology was John Maynard Keynes, especially with his book *The End of Laissez-Faire* (1926). Keynes argued for a new liberalism which would aim for both freedom and safety in life, and a prime method was government measures of various sorts: "Our problem is to work out a social organisation which shall be as efficient as possible

without offending our notions of a satisfactory way of life" (Keynes 1926, 53). Towards the end of the 1920s, Ohlin began to view his role as one of launching this new liberalism in Scandinavia—and this perception was reinforced by the ensuing worldwide depression. Ohlin agreed with Keynes that the depression showed the weakness of the free-market system. In his memoirs, Ohlin stated:

> The view that the old "let-go liberalism" had outlived itself was further confirmed, when I read Keynes's little book "The End of Laissez-Faire" the following year. In 1927 I wrote a few articles on "Liberalism at the Crossroads." The development showed, more and more clearly, that one must accept the demand for "planned organization." (Ohlin 1972, 180)

There were some early signs that Ohlin was not a firm classical liberal. As noted, he favored high inheritance taxes at an early age. Also, on April 26, 1925, he wrote an article in *Stockholms-Tidningen* which, probably for the first time, expressed his appreciation of the "new liberalism" of Keynes and other British economists in somewhat systematic terms.

In connection with the economic problems in the 1930s, Ohlin gradually came to accept not only active stabilization policies but also regulation of agriculture and workplaces. Keynes's *General Theory* (1936) met with great approval, but Ohlin, together with other economists in the so-called Stockholm School, had actually preceded Keynes on several counts, e.g., by having focused on total demand and by having introduced uncertainty (as specified by Ohlin in a letter to the Keynes scholar Don Patinkin on January 6, 1976; see Larsson 1998, 98; cf. Ohlin 1972, ch. 13). One can also add that Ohlin's general outlook on politics was perhaps conducive to a greater acceptance of economic planning: he was rationalistic and held academic thinking in high regard.

As for Ohlin's political involvement, in 1934 he was elected chairman of the Liberal Youth Organization of Sweden, in 1938 he was elected Member of Parliament, and in 1944 he became leader of the Liberal Party—a position he was to hold for 23 years. There are signs that Ohlin's return to Stockholm from Copenhagen was partly motivated by a desire to become involved in politics. In an April 1929 letter to Professor Bernhard Karlgren, he wrote:

> I have always had in my mind that I should try to come to Stockholm, partly because I am very interested in politics. When I have done away with some scientific work in five to ten years, it is quite possible that I start doing politics. (quoted in Larsson 1998, 111)

It seems fair to say that Ohlin's political interest emerged during the tenure in Copenhagen; before the mid-1920s, he had remained focused on academic discussions. Interestingly, this development also appears to have been influenced by the example of Keynes: like him, Ohlin began to think it necessary for economics to have a practical direction and for economists to take part in debates on economic policy.

Ohlin's old benefactor Heckscher began to notice the ideological change during Ohlin's last year in Copenhagen, not least the effect of Keynes. In 1930, Ohlin became professor at the Stockholm School of Economics and was to come into grave conflict with Heckscher. In a letter of August 25, 1935, Ohlin writes, "To some extent your disillusion [with Ohlin's dissociation from laissez-faire ideas] may depend on an inability to comprehend the personal development I underwent from 1925 to 1929, among other things under the influence of Birck" (Larsson 1998, 105).

This conflict was, on the one hand, professional: Ohlin increasingly attacked Heckscher's brand of liberalism and its free-market economics, and this took place both in the Political Economy Club in Stockholm (a discussion group for the leading economists) and in the newspapers. In *Stockholms-Tidningen* during August 1933, Ohlin criticized "the acknowledged authorities" who have a hard time understanding the demands of the age, "caught up as they are in the experiences of the pre-war era, which have degenerated into prejudices" (ibid., 103). Heckscher responded by sharpening his criticism of government intervention (see on this Carlsson 1994). The professional tensions spilled off into the private sphere. In a letter of June 21, 1935, Heckscher accused Ohlin of being "an apostle of central planning" (Larsson 1998, 103), and Ohlin soon replied that "All preconditions for a friendly relationship between Heckscher and Ohlin are missing" (ibid., 106).

Ohlin was to retain his "social-liberal" (Ohlin 1949, 97ff.) views for the remainder of his life, and he never returned to the more classically liberal elements of the early and mid-1920s. However, it bears noting that after World War II, Ohlin's ideological foe was not perceived to be classical liberalism but the more radical variants of collectivism advanced by some leading figures in the ruling Social Democratic Party. Ohlin successfully argued against excessive taxation and socialization of the means of production from the beginning of the Social Democratic reign (see, e.g., Ohlin 1982/1936).

References

Carlsson, Benny. 1994. *The State as a Monster: Gustav Cassel and Eli Heckscher on the Role and Growth of the State*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.

Keynes, John Maynard. 1926. *The End of Laissez-Faire*. London: L. & V. Woolf.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. London: Macmillan & Co.
Larsson, Sven-Erik. 1998. *Bertil Ohlin*. Stockholm: Atlantis.
Ohlin, Bertil. 1949. *The Problem of Employment Stabilization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ohlin, Bertil. 1972. *Ung man blir politiker* [*Young Man Turns Politician*]. Stockholm: Bonniers.
Ohlin, Bertil. 1982 [1936]. *Fri eller dirigerad ekonomi?* [*A Free or a Directed Economy?*]. Stockholm: AB Folk & Samhälle.