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Working Paper No. 748

Efficiency and the Provision of Open Platforms

Working Paper
Reference
Tåg, Joacim (2008). “Efficiency and the Provision of Open Platforms”. IFN Working Paper No. 748. Stockholm: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).

Author
Joacim Tåg

Private firms may not have efficient incentives to allow third-party producers to access their platform or develop extensions for their products. Based on a two-sided market model, I discuss two reasons for why. First, a private firm may not be able to internalize all benefits from cross-group externalities arising with third-party extensions. Second, firms may have strategic incentives to shut out third-parties because it relaxes competition.