Investment liberalizing countries are often concerned that cross-border mergers & acquisitions, in contrast to greenfield investments, might have an adverse effect on domestic firms and consumers. However, given that domestic assets are sufficiently scarce, we identify a preemption effect and an asset complementarity effect, which imply that the acquisition price is significantly higher than the domestic seller's profits. Moreover, we show that for the acquisition to take place, the MNE must be sufficiently efficient when using the domestic assets, otherwise rivals will expand their business, thereby making the acquisition unprofitable. Consequently, restricting cross-border M&As may also hurt consumers.
Working Paper No. 666
Investment Liberalization - Why a Restrictive Cross-Border Merger Policy can be Counterproductive
Working Paper
Reference
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan and Lars Persson (2006). “Investment Liberalization - Why a Restrictive Cross-Border Merger Policy can be Counterproductive”. IFN Working Paper No. 666. Stockholm: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan and Lars Persson (2006). “Investment Liberalization - Why a Restrictive Cross-Border Merger Policy can be Counterproductive”. IFN Working Paper No. 666. Stockholm: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Authors
Pehr-Johan Norbäck, Lars Persson