This Website has a limited use of cookies. By using this website, you are agreeing to the terms and conditions listed in our data protection policy. Read more

Asian Economic Papers

The Impact of CEO Long–Term Equity–Based Compensation Incentives on Economic Growth in Collectivist versus Individualist Countries

Journal Article
Reference
Campbell, Cynthia J. et al. (2016). “The Impact of CEO Long–Term Equity–Based Compensation Incentives on Economic Growth in Collectivist versus Individualist Countries”. Asian Economic Papers 15(2), 109–133. doi.org/10.1162/ASEP_a_00432

Authors
Cynthia J. Campbell, Rosita P. Chang, Jack C. DeJong, Robert Doktor, Lars Oxelheim, Trond Randøy

This study examines the impact of the prevalence of long-term equity-based chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on GDP growth, and we address the moderating role of individualist versus collectivist cultures on this relationship. We argue that long-term incentives given to CEOs in some firms may convey to other CEOs that they too may be able to receive such incentives and rewards if they emulate the incentivized and rewarded CEOs. In a longitudinal study across 22 nations over a 5-year period, we find that the higher proportion of CEOs in a country are awarded long-term equity-based incentive compensation, the greater future real GDP growth, particularly in collectivist countries.

Lars Oxelheim

+46 (0)8 665 4527
+46 (0)70 861 9361
lars.oxelheim@ifn.se